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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
)
vs.
)
)
EKERETE I. INYANGUMIA,
)
Defendant-Appellant. )

JACK M. HELGESEN,

Case No. 17088

------------------------------------------APPELLANT EKERETE I. INYANGUMIA'S BRIEF

------------------------------------------NATURE OF CASE
Respondent, Jack M. Helgesen, filed suit in the
Second District Court in and for Weber County against
Ekerete I. Inyangumia to recover damages allegedly incurred
in an automobile accident which occurred on October 12, 1978.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A Default Judgment was entered against defendantappellant and the District Court denied the defendant's
Motion to Vacate and set aside the Default Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an Order vacating the Default Judgment entered against him.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts out of which this case arises are that
on or about October 12, 1978, at or near Harrison Boulevard
and 3400 South Street, defendant-appellant and plaintiffrespondent were involved in an automobile accident.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondent claims that he sustained injuries in
the October 12, 1978 accident and medical expenses and a
loss of earnings.
On April 15, 1979, respondent was again involved
in an automobile accident with a non-party to this action by
the name of Wendy Meenderink.

The respondent in a separate

claim against Wendy Meenderink has claimed he sustained
injuries in the April 15, 1979 accident and has incurred
medical expenses and has lost earnings due to said injuries.
Coincidentally, both claims made by respondent
Helgesen were referred to Allstate Insurance Company, the
insurer for both appellant and Wendy Meenderink.
Plaintiff thereafter proceeded to negotiate settlement of the two claims together with representatives of
Allstate Insurance Company.

When settlement was not accom-

plished, respondent filed Complaints, on November 16, 1979,
against both appellant and

W~ndy

Meenderink.

Allstate Insur-

ance Company also received, at that point in time, a courtesy
copy of the suit papers with a cover letter from respondent's
counsel suggesting that the matters were still open for
settlement jointly in spite of the suits to be brought in the
Second District Court.
The record discloses that appellant was served
with process on November 24, 1979 and·31 days thereafter a

- 2 -
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default hearing was held before the Honorable Judge John F.
The Default Judgment was signed on December 31,

Wahlquist.

1979.
Although the suit was filed on the same day as the
instant case, by plaintiff, was in default no action was
taken by plaintiff-respondent towards default.
On January 11, 1980 appellant, immediately after
receiving notice of the entry of the default, filed his
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment pursuant to Rule

60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appellant's

Motion was supported by an Answer, Affidavit and a Memorandum
of Points and Authorities supporting the same.

Appellant's

Motion to Set Aside the Default was called up for hearing on
March 3, 1980.

The court conditionally denied appellant's

Motion and granted appellant ten days to submit additional
Affidavits.
The additional Affidavits of the appellant and Mr.
Charles Kent, an adjuster for Allstate, were filed on March

12, 1980.

At the court's own intitiative, a second hearing

was held on defendant's Motion and again the court refused
to grant the relief sought.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b).

- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Rule 60{b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just
the court may, in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order or proceeding
for the following reasons:
•

(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b);

(3) Fraud, whether heretofore denominated
extrinsic, misrepresentation or other conduct of an adverse party;
(4) When, for any cause, the summons in the
action has not been personally served upon
the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and
the defendant has failed to appear in said
action;
(5)

The judgment is void;

(6) The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective applications; or
(7) Any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4) not more than
three months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken . . . .
The present case involves a rather simple yet
understandable situation of confusion and mistake that was
precipitated by months of negotiations between the respondent's counsel and claims representatives of Allstate

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Insurance Company.

When all of the circumstances, shown

by Affidavits in the _record, are examined together it is
clear that the relief sought by appellant in the court below
was erroneously denied contrary to the interests of fundamental fairness and efficiency and the denial was an abuse of
•

discretion.
The underlying principle of Rule 60{b) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, is to balance the interests of the defendant in having his day in court and being heard on the merits
against plaintiff's interest in the finality of the judgment.
A motion to vacate a default judgment, and
particularly when timely filed, is to be
treated to best serve the ends of justice
and preserve to a litigant his day in court.
It is said that the court must, in a proper
case, upon such a motion, yield the procedural exactitudes to the more basic rules of
fundamental fairness. On the other hand,
relief from a default judgment on the basis
of equitable principles is to be granted
only when the occasion demands it, or when
the exercise of such power is necessary to
prevent injustice. In any determination of
whether a default judgment should be set
aside the court is guided by equitable principles requiring that a defendant be given
a fair opportunity to litigate a disputed
obligation, and also requiring that a plaintiff who has, according to regular legal
proceedings, secured judgment, be protected
against a violation of the rule which requires the sanctity and security of a valid
judgment. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgment §686.
This court on various occasions has indicated its
agreement with the position stated in the noted authority
immediately above.

In the recent case of Olsen v. Cummings,

565 P.2d 1123 (1977), this court repeated its position as to
vacation of Default Judgments:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Although a trial court is endowed with
considerable latitude of discretion in
granting or deny a motion to vacate a final
judgment, it cannot act arbitrarily.·
. • • It is quite uniformly regarded as an
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a
default judgment where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear, and timely application
is made to set it aside.
(Quoting from
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376

P.2d 951, (1962))
Because an application to set aside a
default is equitable in nature and is addressed to the conscience of the court, all
of the attendant circumstances should be
considered. Relief in doubtful cases generally will be granted so a party may have
a hearing.
See also Baird v. Intermountain
School Federal Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877
(Ut. 197 5).
The scope of discretion of the trial court in the
review of its exercise was discussed by this court in the
recent case of Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (1976).

In

the Carmen case the trial court granted a Default Judgment
against one of two defendants pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the defendant failed
to appear at his deposition as ordered.

This court's review

of the facts pointed out that there had been some confusion
in the defendant's relationship with his attorney, although
service and notice of the deposition were not questioned.
This court vacated the default, commenting on the trial
court's discretion as follows:
It is true that where the authority to
perform a proposed action rests with the discretion of the court we must allow considerable latitude in which he may exercise his
judgment.
But this does not mean the court

- 6 -
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has unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary
manner fundamental to the concept of the rule
of law is the principle that reason and justice shall prevail over the arbitrary and
uncontrolled will of any one person; and that
this applies to all men in every status: To
courts and judges as well as to autocrats or
bureaucrats. The meaning of the term 'discretion' itself imports that the action
should be taken within the reason and good
conscience in the interests of protecting
the rights of both parties and serving the
ends of justice. It always has been the
policy our law to resolve doubt in favor of
permitting parties to have their day in
court on the merits of a controversy. 546
P.2d at 603.
In an earlier decision, Kelly v. Scott, 5 Ut.2d
159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956), this court also spoke concerning
the discretion granted to a trial court in setting aside a
Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 60{b).
The following observation was made:
Although this court has been reluctant to
reverse a trial court on a decision not to
vacate a default judgment and will not do
so where it appears that all elements were
considered, we have here the somewhat dubious advantage of viewing the entire confused record and there appears to be no
equities, other than the time involved,
which mitigate against the rule that discretion must be exercised in the furtherance of justice and that ordinarily the
court should incline towards granting
relief so that the matter might be heard
on its merits. 298 P.2d at 823.
In the instant case each and every criteria required for the relief sought from the default judgment has
been satisfied.

Accordingly, the trial court has abused its

discretion in denying the defendant-appellant's Motion.

- 7 -
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In

particular, the Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered in this matter clearly demonstrate that the court
below has misinterpreted the import of Rule 60{b) and incorrectly applied the controlling rule of law.
The trial court found that (1) the defendantappellant had not presented the court with any substantial
issue on the question of liability and (2) the reasons presented by the defendant-appellant for its failure to respond
in a timely fashion to plaintiff's Complaint did not constitute mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect justifying
relief under Rule 60(b).
The trial court has abused its discretion by going
beyond the parameters of Rule 60(b) in that the trial court,
instead of determining if justice required that the judgment
be set aside due to the fact of mistake and inadvertence,
has made a finding as to the sufficiency of the Affidavit
I

and reasoning proffered to support defendant's 60(b) Motion.
A careful review of the Affidavit offered by defendant, of Mr. Charles Kent, an adjuster for Allstate Insurance
Company, clearly reveals that Mr. Kent was "mistaken" as to
the intentions of plaintiff and his attorney because of a
certain letter received by Allstate Insurance Company prior
to the filing of the Complaint in this matter.

Mr. Kent, by

Affidavit, explains that he was responsible for the adjusting

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of two separate claims being made by the plaintiff-respondent
against two Allstate insureds, and additionally that considerable negotiations entertained by plaintiff's counsel
and himself relative to settlement.

Mr. Kent, also by

Affidavit, explains that plaintiff's counsel was insistent
that the two claims be settled for one lump sum, which offer
Mr. Kent continually rejected.

The real confusion actually

arose when on or about November 12, 1979 Mr. Kent received a
letter from plaintiff's counsel, a copy of which is attached
to Mr. Kent's Affidavit, in which plaintiff's attorney
again offered that his client's claims be settled for the
one payment of $18,000.00.

Mr. Kent mistakenly understood

Mr. Hasenyager's letter, coupled with the earlier negotiation
conferences, to mean that plaintiff was still interested in
effecting a settlement and there would be further contact
and negotiation over the matter.

The Complaint in this

matter was not filed for several days after Mr. Kent received
his courtesy copy of the Complaint, nor was the defendantappellant served for some time thereafter.

The following

language taken from Mr. Hasenyager's letter was the reason
for Mr. Kent's misunderstanding and "mistake":
Our efforts to settle these two cases for the
sum of $18,000.00 will remain open through
the 20 day period for answering the respective complaints, otherwise the cases will be
tried.

- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Kent mistakenly understood Mr. Hasenyager's
letter to indicate that the of fer would remain open "through"
the particular time for answering the Complaint.

Mr. Kent's

interpretation of the term "through," whether reasonable or
not, was that Mr. Hasenyager planned to file his Complaints
and have the insureds served but that time for accepting the
offer of settlement or answering the Complaints would remain
open "beyond" the 20 days rather than "during" the 20 days
for answering.

Mr. Hasenyager, plaintiff's counsel, use of

the term "through" is nebulous and ambiguous and in this
case tended to create a confusion which resulted in the
defendant-appellant's failure to respond prior to the entry
of a Default Judgment.
The court below after reviewing the Affidavit of
Mr. Kent, which Affidavit was uncontroverted, found that the
Affidavit was not sufficient to constitute mistake, inadvertence or inexcusable neglect.

The very wording of the

court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicates
that the court seemingly has applied Rule 60(b)(l) with a
qualifying factor to each of the particular criteria upon
which relief can be granted.

A careful review of 60(b) will

find that only the criteria "neglect" is qualified by the
term "excusable."

The references to mistake or inadvertence

are unqualified and do not require or allow a finding of the
court as to whether the same are excusable, reasonable or
justified.

The term "mistake" in and of itself is not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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qualified as being excusable or not.

Webster defines mistake

as:

1. An error caused by lack of skill, attention, knowledge, etc.;
2.

A misunderstanding or misconception;

3.

To regard or identify wrongly;

4.

To understand, interpret, or evaluate
wrongly: misunderstand.
Clearly Mr. Kent has indicated that the failure to
respond was due to his mistake or misconception of what
plaintiff was requiring of the defendant and its insurer.
The affidavit of Mr. Kent recites the necessary underlying
factual setting and thus mistake is shown.

Mr.

Kent clearly

misunderstood the import of Mr. Hasenyager's, plaintiff's
counsel, letter; for the court then to make a finding that
Mr. Kent's Affidavit was not sufficient to constitute mistake is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.

The

dicta of this court in the case of Olsen v. Cummings, supra,
is applicable in the instant case, quoting once again:
• . • It is quite uniformly regarded as an
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a
default judgment when there is reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear and timely application is
made to set it aside. 565 P.2d at 1124.
The record will disclose that timely application
was made by the defendant to have the e11try of judgment set
aside.

There is no dispute that application for the relief

sought was timely made.

- 11 -
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The second major issue for focus is whether the
defendant has offered a meritorious defense to the claims
made by the plaintiff in this action.

It is recognized that

the general rule of law in this state is that a party seeking
to vacate a Default Judgment:
. . • must proffer some defense of at
least sufficient ostensible merit as would
justify a trial of the issue thus raised.
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corporation, 545 P.2d 507, (1976).
It is defendant-appellant's contention that the
court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the
Default Judgment on the basis that the court had not been
presented with any substantial issue on the question of
liability.

The affidavit offered by

defendant~

Mr.

Inyangumia, along with the Answer, including affirmative
defenses contained therein, would have to be completely
disregarded in order for the court to find that they had not
been presented with any substantial issue on the question
of liability.

In the Downey State Bank case the trial

court appropriately found that the defendant had failed to
proffer any meritorious defense, or in fact any defense at
all.

Clearly, the Downey State Bank case is distinguishable

f rom the instant action.

. 's
A close review o f Mr. Inyangumia

Affidavit will show that defendant contests plaintiff's
claim on the question of liability and in fact asserts that
the plaintiff himself was responsible for the collision in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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question and the resulting injuries.

Clearly the court be-

low has misapprehended the controlling rule of law.

Under

this state's Comparative Negligence Statute, Mr. Inyangumia's
defense need not be a complete defense but need only rise to
the level of a partial defense for which the trier could
attribute a portion of the negligence to the plaintiff and a
portion to the defendant.

To completely disregard the

Affidavit of Mr. Inyangumia, given to support the Answer and
affirmative defenses proffered, is certainly an abuse of
discretion of the court requiring that the Order of the
trial court be reversed.
Additionally, defendant-appellant has answered
denying that the damages plaintiff alleges in his Complaint,
if any, were proximately caused by the accident complained
of in the instant case.

Arguments presented by defendant

pointed out to the court below that plaintiff had, prior to
commencement of the action, been involved in a separate
accident for which similar claims were being made for injuries.

In spite of these definite issues as to damages the

court refused to recognize defendant's proffer of meritorious defenses.
In balancing the equities in this matter it is
imperative that some consideration be given as to the prejudice either party sl1all sustain should the Order of the
trial court be reversed.

It can be contemplated that the

plaintiff-respondent will argue that the reopening of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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matter will greatly prejudice him inasmuch as he will now be
obligated to go forward with his case and prove both the
liability and damage aspects of his claim.

The fallacy with

this argument is that in each case where there has been a
Default Judgment, ·the prejudice will always be the same,
i.e., the non-defaulting party will then be required to
litigate his claims on the merits.

No party has contended

that either the defendant or his insurer has willfully acted
to cause or create the circumstances as they now exist.

In

balancing the equities then, the extreme hardship will be
placed upon the defendant-appellant in this matter due to
the fact that he is now foreclosed from trying his case on
the merits.
This court has recognized the extreme hardship
that a substantial Default Judgment can involve and has
stressed the liberality with which Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure should be applied in such cases.

Utah Sand

and Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Ut.2d 407, 402 P.2d
703 (1965).

In the Utah Sand case, plaintiff brought an

action alleging in excess of $20,000.00 owing in Third District Court but served defendant with a Summons marked "City
Court" whose jurisdictional limit was $1,000.00.

Soon

thereafter, on plaintiff's Motion, the Summons was amended
to show the Third District Court and defendant was advised
of the amendment by mail.
Judgment was taken.

No Answer was filed and Default

Defendant's Motion to have the judgment

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(b) Judgment.
Judgment by default may be
entered as· follows:
• . • (2) By the court:
In all other cases
the party entitled to a judgment by default
shall apply to the court therefore.
If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary
to take into account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth
of any averment by evidence or to make an
investigation of any other matter, the court
may conduct such hearings or orders such
references as it deems necessary and proper.
It is clear from plaintiff's Complaint that in
order to enable the court to enter judgment, it was necessary
in order to determine the ·amount of damages to make an investigation, and receive appropriate and competent evidence.
As is demonstrated in the transcription of the default
hearing, the evidence offered was offered solely by the
plaintiff himself, and no competent or admissible evidence
was introduced as to the medical condition of the piaintiff.
In addition, all testimony given by the plaintiff concerning
his loss of earnings was totally conjectural and speculative
based upon no supporting documentation or admissible testimony.

The evidence offered as to loss of earnings was as

follows:

Q Now, you have stated in your Complaint
that the best estimate of the time lost and
the wages lost for that time would be
$800.00 a month.
A

Right.

Q For two months, is that correct?
A

Yeah, that's right.
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Q Now . • .
A That's hard to judge because building
houses for sale, speculation, and selling
real estate are really. . • I don't have
much to judge as a salary.
The transcript of the default hearing held in this
matter is demonstrative of the fact that the evidence proffered was not sufficient "to determine the amount of damages
or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence."
Rule 55(b)(2).
In a recent case entitled Pitts v. Pine Meadows
Ranch, 589 P.2d 767 (Ut. 1978), this court dealt with a
similar question concerning the damage issue.

In the Pitts

case, plaintiff sought recovery for trespass to real property.

At the time of granting the default, the trial court

took evidence on damages but the record shows that the
evidence of diminution of value in the value of the trees
involved on the property was not sufficient and the court
entered the large judgment only because the defendant had
been dilatory in not responding to a lawsuit.

This court

upheld the validity of the default taken in the case but
remanded pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for a hearing to establish damages.
In the instant case, not only is the record devoid
of any competent evidence or findings regarding damages but
the Complaint, on_ its face, shows at a minimum the double
recovery on the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff.
The same relief sought by appellant has been granted in other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cases by this court.

See J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Daniel

W. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (1979).
CONCLUSION
Principles of fundamental fairness and equity have
been violated when a party to an action, in good faith,
mistakenly comprehends the intentions of an adverse party,
which mistake ends in a Default Judgment in a sum in excess
of $16,000.00.

It was an abuse of discretion for the court

below to deny the relief from the Default Judgment entered
in this matter.
The mistake in this matter is evidenced by the fact
that plaintiff-respondent moved forward to default on the
instant matter but took no action against the other Allstate
insured, Wendy Meenderink, though that case was also in default.

This case stands as a perfect example of a windfall

where plaintiff-respondent has used the Rules of Procedure
to obtain a judgment which would not have been granted by a
jury sitting in this state.

Plaintiff's counsel knew where

to contact persons responsible to answer on behalf of the
defendant, and though there was no legal obligation for him
to do so, the fact that he had been negotiating with Mr.
Charles Kent for some months prior to the actual filing of
the Complaint placed upon plaintiff's counsel some degree of
responsibility to equitably conclude the matter short of a
windfall judgment.

Plaintiff's counsel's offer of settlement

which accompanied the courtesy copy of the Summons and
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Complaint, now estoppes plaintiff from relying on the procedural exactitudes of ·the rule.

Again turning the court's

attention to the record in this matter, it is shown that the
court made inquiry of plaintiff's counsel why the defendant,
or its insurer, had not responded.

The following is taken

from the transcipt of the record:
The Court:
I'm curious about why they did
not appear. Was there some denial of coverage or something of this sort?
Mr. Hasenyager:
There has not been, your
Honor. As a matter of fact, if I • • .

Q.

Mr. Helgesen, on August 3 of 1979, did
you also go to Dr. Brewer for a second opinion at the request of Allstate Insurance
Company?
A.

Yes, I was requested by Allstate.

Mre Hasenyager:
I frankly don't know, and
there is a bill being sent to Mr. Helgesen
for $100.00 for Dr. Brewer's examination
which was done at the request of Allstate
Insurance Company.
I do not know why they
have not responded to this complaint. We
filed it and they were sent. . • And I
have a copy of my letter which I could submit to the court, which was sent to Allstate
Insurance Company which included a copy of
the complaint itself. We told them we were
filing it and we had Mr. Inyangumia served
on the 24th of November. There has been no
. • . absolutely no response from either Mr.
Inyangumia or the insurance company.
The Court:
Did you send them a copy of the
memorandum which you filed?
Mr. Hasenyager:
I did not, your Honor.
That was filed with the court I think about
two days or so before Christmas . . . . Well,
it would have last Thursday or Friday.
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According to plaintiff's counsel's own admission,
he did not know make any effort to contact Allstate.

Appel-

lant recognizes that plaintiff had no legal obligation to do
so but did have some equitable obligation because of the
lengthy months of negotiation that had been undertaken to
conclude this matter.

Additionally, by plaintiff's coun-

sel's own statement in the record, he indicates that the
Memorandum was filed several days before Christmas, 1979.
This means that the Memorandum would have necessarily been
prepared sometime prior to that or in other words, shortly
after the time had run for answering.
It is also perfectly clear that if the default
were vacated, plaintiff would only suffer the inconvenience
of a delay in having the matter resolved by a trier of fact.
In view of the large sum and the injustice involved in this
case, Rule 60(b) should be applied with great liberality.
Defendant has met the standards for relief under such a
liberal application and should be granted a vacation of the
judgment.

If this court were to hold otherwise, plaintiff

will be in a windfall position while defendant will be denied
a just hearing on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this

/B

day of July, 1980.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
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